(Re)producing Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka: Advancing the discursive formations of self-Orientalism, religious (im)mobility and 'unethical' conversion by WOODS, Orlando
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
4-2018
(Re)producing Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka:
Advancing the discursive formations of self-
Orientalism, religious (im)mobility and 'unethical'
conversion
Orlando WOODS
Singapore Management University, orlandowoods@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721x.2017.1402831
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Religion Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WOODS, Orlando.(2018). (Re)producing Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka: Advancing the discursive formations of self-Orientalism,
religious (im)mobility and 'unethical' conversion. Religion, 48(2), 215-235.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2425
 1 
 
 
(Re)producing Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka: Advancing the discursive 
formations of self-Orientalism, religious (im)mobility and ‘unethical’ 
conversion 
Orlando Woods, Singapore Management University 
Published in Religion, 20 Nov 2017, Pages 1-21, Advance online 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2017.1402831 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores how Buddhist groups in Sri Lanka attempt to suppress conversion to Christianity. 
Conversion to Christianity can dilute the power and legitimacy of Buddhist groups, which has caused 
them to promote a discourse of ‘unethical’ conversion. My argument is that such a discourse is self-
Orientalising in nature, and is designed to enable the (re)production of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka. 
By constructing Buddhists as vulnerable and in need of protection, the hegemonic actions of Buddhist 
groups are validated. These constructions serve to restrict the religious (and socio-cultural) mobility of 
Buddhists, and to legitimise the persecution of Christians through both legislative and violent means. 
Sensitivity to the effects of self-Orientalism reveals the need for more critical readings of the effects of 
religious protectionism on both the Christian other, and the national self as well. 
KEYWORDS: Religious conversion, self-Orientalism, Buddhist hegemony, evangelical Christianity, 
religious mobility, Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past five years, a growing body of work has started to explore the vicissitudes of inter-religious 
competition and conflict in post-war Sri Lanka. It has examined the socio-spatial dimensions of religious 
praxis (Woods 2012a Woods, O. 2012a.; Bauman and Ponniah 2017), legal and ethical debates around 
religious conversion (Mahadev 2014; Kong and Woods 2016; Schonthal 2016), the impact of religion on 
state formation (Fernando 2014), and the religious underpinnings of political violence (Gravers 2015; 
Johnson 2016). Despite the breadth of foci, such work is united in its consideration of the effects of 
Buddhist hegemony on marginal religious groups, especially Christian. Christian groups wield 
disproportionate influence in Sri Lanka, as they are often globally networked, and associated with 
Western forms of modernity. Relatively little attention has, however, been paid to exploring the methods 
employed by Buddhist groups to (re)produce their hegemonic position in response to such (perceived) 
Christian influence. The fact that religion continues to be an understudied (or functional) determinant of 
nationalist discourse (Sturm in press; after Kinnvall 2004) helps explain this oversight, but not justify it. 
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This paper fills the lacuna by exploring the enduring tension between nationalism and globalisation, and 
how such a tension is materialised through religion. Being a ‘particularly powerful response’ 
(Juergensmeyer 1996; Spohn 2003; Kaldor 2004; Kinnvall 2004, 741; Brubaker 2012) to the dictates of 
globalisation, religious nationalisms are often relative constructs that are formed in response to the 
intermixing brought about by the globalisation of religion. Such intermixing necessitates the discursive 
positioning of religions relative to each other, and can encourage a range of outcomes – from inter-
religious acceptance and accommodation on the one hand, to inter-religious competition and conflict on 
the other (Kong and Woods 2016). Given that religion is, fundamentally, a matter of individual choice, 
and can therefore be changed at will (or not, as the case often is – see Asad 1996), globalisation poses a 
threat to the solidarity of religiously defined nations. In response, strategies of religious ‘protectionism’ 
(see Robbins 2004; Salemink 2009; Bauman and Ponniah 2017) are developed and deployed in order to 
strengthen religious majorities and weaken those deemed a ‘threat’ to the strength and unity of the 
national religion. 
The self-serving relationship between religious ‘threat’ and religious ‘protection’ is clearly evinced in Sri 
Lanka. Since independence from British rule in 1948, ‘gaining or maintaining political power [has been] 
intrinsic to Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalist religiosity’ (Holt 1998, 188), and has firmly established 
Buddhism as a pillar of the nationalist discourse. To further their hegemonic position, nationalist groups 
have increasingly (re)produced Buddhism in response to the threat of other religions, most notably 
Christianity. Christianity is often constructed in an antagonistic frame, which serves to legitimise 
expressions of Buddhist hegemony. It evokes the colonial past, and, in its evangelical form, represents the 
neocolonial imposition of foreign – implicitly Western – idea(l)s upon Sri Lankan society and culture. 
This dynamic has led to the creation of new geometries of power, persecution and control, which find 
meaning and relevance in public discourses of religious conversion and unethical Christian praxis. Yet, as 
much as these discourses condemn the Christian other, they also implicate the Buddhist self in ways that 
are more self-serving than have hitherto been recognised. This has led to a situation whereby ‘Buddhism 
is consciously invoked by politically motivated Sinhalas to advance their own empowerment (usually to 
the exclusion of other communities) or to rationalise their agendas for actions taken against other 
communities in post hoc fashion’ (Holt 1998, 189, original emphasis). 
In light of this situation, this paper advances an understanding of the ways in which Buddhist groups 
create and distort public discourses of religion in order to (re)produce their hegemonic power. In 
recognition of the fact that nationalist ideals and imageries are often ‘the avatar of orientalism’ 
(Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993, 12), I propose that the concept of self-Orientalism helps to reveal 
the self-serving architectures of power and enmity that reside at the heart of religious nationalism. The 
threat of religious conversion leads to the materialisation of such architectures, as conversion serves to 
both directly and indirectly weaken the foundational identity upon which religious nationalisms are based. 
In response to such a threat, self-Orientalism is a strategy by which (in this case, Buddhist) nationalist 
groups seek to perpetuate an image of vulnerability, which, in turn, is used to legitimise the need for 
protection of the (Buddhist) self, and the suppression of (Christian) others. In Sri Lanka, self-
Orientalising discourses of unethical conversion to Christianity aim to prevent such weakening, but also 
cast Buddhists within a structure of marginality that leads to socio-cultural intransigence. Indeed, whilst 
the relationship between religious conversion and socio-economic mobility has been identified and 
expounded (e.g., Alston 1971; Welch and Baltzell 1984; Tong 2008; see also Woods 2012b), treatments 
of religious conversion as a form of mobility in and of itself have so far eluded theorisation. 
This paper is split into three main sections. The first examines the relationship between religion and 
power, focusing specifically on the role of Orientalism – and, more recently, self-Orientalism – therein. 
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The second explains how nationalist discourse has self-Orientalising tendencies, which can negatively 
affect the people it claims to represent. Focusing specifically on the (re)production of Buddhist hegemony 
in Sri Lanka, the third explores how the debate around unethical conversion is an example of self-
Orientalism in praxis, which can lead to a number of outcomes, from socio-cultural intransigence and 
religious (im)mobility, to inter-religious violence. In conclusion, I call for future work to develop 
comparative perspectives on how discourses of self-Orientalism intersect with, and ultimately restrict, 
projects of postcolonial emancipation. 
 
Power and the (re)production of religion 
The spread of Christianity throughout parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America is one of the most enduring 
legacies of the period of European colonisation; in many countries, it continues to be associated with 
various forms of socio-economic modernisation and Western cultural imperialism. Since the colonial 
epoch, therefore, the (re)production of religion has been inseparable from discourses of power and control 
(after Berger 1967). Manifested in various ways in the postcolonial world, such discourses reveal how 
‘power is no longer conceived in terms of physical or even political force, but rather it takes the form of 
representation’ (Yan and Santos 2009; see also Feighery 2012, 271). Orientalism is a prominent example 
of the power of representation. Yet, whilst the project of postcolonial emancipation from colonial control 
has resulted in Orientalising discourses of the colonial epoch being engaged with, dismantled and 
reconstructed, their emancipatory value should not be assumed. Reconstructions of Orientalism can be 
self-referential, especially when religion is being represented by producers of cultural discourses. In this 
sense, as much as emancipation is about the liberation from pre-existing structures of power and control, 
it must also be recognised as a process that invariably results in the creation of new forms of power. 
Below I explore the relationship between power and the (re)production of religion in more detail. First, 
through an examination of Orientalism and religion, followed by a critical examination of how self-
Orientalism has become a self-serving strategy used by hegemonic producers of culture. 
 
Religion and/as Orientalism 
Orientalism is about creating and amplifying difference and distinction, and is intimately entwined with 
representations of power and control. An Orientalist reading of power thus helps to reveal how it ‘is 
virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and 
judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces’ (Said 1978, 19). Orientalism is a projective technique that 
involves using patterns of understanding, control and manipulation in order to magnify imbalances in 
power (see Springer 2011). Such magnification can reveal who is representing who, and for what purpose. 
As a category of understanding, and as a label used to identify and differentiate, religion occupies a 
‘privileged status as the foremost site of essentialized difference’ (van der Veer 2002, 173). Not only that, 
but during the period of European colonisation, the categorisation of religion served a more applied 
purpose as a form of social ordering. Local religious traditions were often ‘restyled or “discovered” … as 
distinct religions’ (Beyer 2003, 147), the aim being to demarcate and identify religious difference, and 
thus distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. In this sense, some ‘religions’ can be interpreted as outcomes of 
processes of Orientalist knowledge production, causing their labels to be somewhat removed from the 
practices and beliefs from which they originated. 
Such practices are purposefully reductive, and are based on a re-imagination of religion within the frame 
of Western modernity. The labelling of Hinduism, for example, can be interpreted as an invented category 
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of understanding imposed on one group by another. Such labelling has long been recognised to ‘feed on 
Orientalist understandings of India and are thus deeply implicated in Western conceptions of modernity’ 
(van der Veer 1994, 656; see also van der Veer 1999, 2002). Legacies of European colonialism in general, 
and of Orientalist forms of knowledge in particular, are as far-reaching as they are enduring. Specifically, 
categories of inclusion and exclusion, self and other, us and them continue to provide a framework for 
socio-political ordering. Over time, Orientalist discourse has, in other words, become a self-referential 
basis for contemporary identity construction. Religious groups in particular leverage such discourses in 
order to unify and homogenise their religious communities against the destabilising effects of the state, 
and inter-religious conversion (van der Veer 2001). 
 
Orientalism’s self-reflexive mirror 
In recent years, Orientalist discourse has adopted a more self-reflexive mantle. Self-Orientalism refers to 
the appropriation of Orientalist discourse by ‘Orientals’, causing ‘the Orient’ to shift from being a passive 
recipient of Orientalism to an active agent in its (re)production. Despite its wide-ranging utility as an 
analytical lens, within the academy, self-Orientalism has been limited to East Asian media and cultural 
studies (e.g., Iwabuchi 2002; Chan 2004; Chung 2006; Suter 2012; see also Umbach and Wishnoff 2008), 
and tourism studies focusing on Asia and the Middle East (Yan and Santos 2009; Feighery 2012; see also 
Jafari 2012). For the purposes of religion, the utility of such studies is that they recognise that discourses 
of self-Orientalism are perpetuated by ‘hegemonic cultural producers’ that serve to reproduce patterns of 
distance and control, which in turn cause the constructed to become ‘disciplined into ways of thinking and 
acting’ (Berger 1967; see also Feighery 2012, 281–282). The problem, however, is that they present such 
(re)productions in a positive light (as form of discursive and/or economic arbitrage), and do not consider 
the possibility for ongoing distortion of the self through the production of a normative narrative. 
In recognising the role of religious groups as ‘hegemonic cultural producers’, my reading of self-
Orientalism seeks to recast the relationship between the producers of cultural imagery, and those 
produced by it, in a more critical light. Thus, self-Orientalism is a strategy by which cultural producers 
classify, subordinate and suppress those they produce for political gain. A central paradox stems from the 
fact that the ‘self’ of self-Orientalism refers not to the producers of the discourse, but to those from which 
they gain strength. That the producers and produced share the same ‘essentialised’ badge of religious 
identity serves to validate representations of the self. The illusion of sameness does, however, obscure 
both the political motivations behind self-Orientalism, and its distantiating effect. As Salgado (2011, 201) 
argues, processes of self-representation can serve to ‘deepen and entrench the differences generated by 
orientalist discourse itself, working to re-enforce rather than dismantle its hegemonizing drives’. Thus, the 
familiarity of the ‘self’ is a source of deception that renders the discourse valid and resonant in theory, but 
selective and divisive in practice. 
The validity of such productions increases their hegemonic potential. Their resonance renders them 
‘highly infectious and easily communicable’ (Springer 2011, 93), and a potent tool for the contemporary 
(re)production of power. Given such virulence, self-Orientalism is an effective arbiter of political 
mobilisation, and foregrounds many contemporary strains of nationalism. In light of this, I suggest that 
the conceptual underpinnings of self-Orientalism have the ability to contribute new understandings of the 
distorted (and often deceptive) relationship between cultural producers and the produced within a 
nationalist schema. Such a relationship is predicated on a critical reading of nationalism: one that 
resonates vividly in the postcolonial world, where relatively unchecked expressions of religious 
hegemony prevail. 
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Postcolonial nationalism in critical perspective 
The lens of self-Orientalism encourages more critical analyses of postcolonial nationalisms, especially 
those based on religion. The triumvirate of religion, nationalism and Orientalism is ‘intimately connected’ 
(van der Veer 1999, 423; after Said 1978) and self-referential. Coalescing to form a potent tool of 
political mobilisation, there is, however, a tendency to view Orientalism as the stimulus against which 
nationalist movements identify. Orientalism is, in other words, commonly interpreted as just an input to 
the nationalist imagination, rather than an output as well. Viewing (religious) nationalisms from a self-
Orientalising perspective can, however, reveal the distorting, manipulating and hegemonic effects of 
Orientalist discourse. Below I unravel these relationships in more detail; first by interpreting nationalism 
as a form of self-Orientalism, and second by highlighting the (de)mobilising effects of religious 
nationalism. 
 
Nationalism as self-Orientalism 
Throughout the postcolonial world, it is not uncommon to find nationalist fervour superimposed upon a 
backdrop of poverty, social inequality and hegemonic structures of power and control. Ethereal ideals to 
which the nationalist imagination panders exist in a paradoxical relationship with their day-to-day 
application and resonance; a relationship that is rooted in the fact that nationalism is, fundamentally, a 
process of ‘deception and self-deception’ (Gellner 1983, 56). Architects of the nationalist imagination 
perpetuate such ‘deceptions’, revealing how ‘any amount of power and prestige must be jointly consumed 
with negative quantities of it … it is impossible for someone to dominate if somebody is not dominated: 
positive power must be jointly consumed with negative power’ (Pagano 2003, 640). Religious 
nationalisms elevate this dynamic, as they are based on a homogenised identity that ‘constructs and 
confirms the need for unity against the threatening [religious other]’ (van der Veer 1994, 661). Unity is 
based on the construction and demarcation of clear, often simplified and distorted, religious boundaries. 
The distortion and manipulation of such boundaries reveal the self-Orientalising tendencies of nationalist 
discourse. Constructing the nation is often an exercise in asymmetry, which involves ‘imposing the 
culture, values, attitudes, etc., of a select minority as representative of the diverse majority’ (Lau 2009, 
574; see also Lau and Mendes 2011). In many instances, as the producers of the discourse gain 
prominence, they can become divorced from the produced, even though both continue to be implicated by 
the overall construction. As Gellner (1983, 57) recognises: 
Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously 
low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the 
population … [It] is the very opposite of what nationalism affirms and what nationalists fervently 
believe. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is 
drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants. 
In accordance with such a sceptical treatment of ‘folk culture’, Breman’s (1988) detailed deconstruction 
of the ‘myth’ of the Asian village serves to problematise many of the rhetorical assumptions that are used 
to buttress contemporary nationalist movements. Writing of Thailand’s radical intelligentsia, for example, 
Winichakul (2008, 579) highlights how ‘the Thai village – or rather an essentialised, even orientalised, 
version of it’ became an embellished symbol of national resistance to the Western forces that threatened 
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to destabilise the state apparatus. Such an expression of the ‘high culture’ of which Gellner speaks deny 
the constructed a voice in a way that restricts the possibility for self-expression, advancement and change. 
It is a ‘culturally imposed stupefaction of the people’ (Lele 1993, 59) that enables hegemony to be 
(re)produced, and individual emancipation denied. To varying degrees, articulations of nationalist 
hegemony serve to restrict the mobility of the masses by framing them in self-restrictiv(e/ing) terms. 
Importantly, this dynamic is keenly felt in Sri Lanka, where, throughout the country’s period of 
postcolonial development, ‘the peasant [has been] at the centre of the nationalist myth’ (see also Moore 
1985; Peebles 2001; Wickramasinghe 2006, 333). Whilst such myths are designed to inspire and unite 
otherwise disparate groups of people, they often belie political intent. 
 
The (de)mobilising effects of religious nationalism 
The nationalist imagination is at once a mobilising and demobilising force. By its very nature, it is a form 
of collective mobilisation that subordinates the individual to the group. As Kinnvall (2004, 758; see also 
Friedland 2001; Brubaker 2012) recognises, ‘the most influential idea behind nationalism … [is] the 
notion of the individual self as a united, self-sufficient, and self-contained entity – a “universal self”’. 
Nationalism binds people together through a common sense of belonging or identity. Yet, such bindings 
can restrict as much as they unify. Whilst it is widely accepted that nationalists aim to ‘enforce traditional 
social boundaries’ in a bid to preserve the ‘legitimacy of their own bases of identity and power’ 
(Juergensmeyer 2002, 9, 10), little consideration has been given to the effects of such enforcement on 
individual mobility. Indeed, whilst the formation of nationalist movements as a response to blocked 
mobility has been identified (e.g., Cormier 2003), the demobilising effects of nationalism have not. 
Moreover, given the mutually reinforcing relationship between individual mobility and processes of 
modernisation (see Breman 1988; Rudnyckyj 2010), it is apparent that the demobilising aspect of 
nationalism can have wide-ranging ramifications that go beyond issues of identity and belonging. 
The homogenising tendencies of nationalism limit, and often denounce the potential for individual 
autonomy. Religious nationalisms in particular hold a latent desire to restrict individual autonomy and 
choice, as they can lead to religious conversion and the direct weakening of the power base of religiously 
defined nations. Evangelical Christian groups are the most prominent arbiters of religious conversion; 
their praxis is based on an assumption of religious mobility. If individuals did not have the ability to 
convert, then there would be no point in evangelism. In this sense, ‘mobility’ is less about physical 
movement than it is part of a broader understanding of individual autonomy; one in which the presence of 
options and freedom of choice are defining features of being mobile. In many countries where religious 
nationalisms prevail, conversion has become an option that is increasingly difficult to exercise, given that 
converting out of the dominant religion places the convert in a position of socio-cultural marginality, and 
often precarity. 
Drawing on 106 in-depth interviews that were conducted with evangelical Christians, Buddhists, and 
other stakeholders throughout 2010–2011, the discussion that follows demonstrates how Buddhist groups 
in Sri Lanka have developed a self-Orientalising discourse of unethical conversion that aims to restrict 
religious mobility and, by extension, conversion to Christianity. Such a discourse has been (re)produced 
in response to the threat posed by evangelical Christian groups that have been increasingly active in the 
country since the 1980s. Embedded within global networks of funding, ideas and shared ambition, 
evangelical groups are seen to erode the primordial structures of Buddhist power and control over Sri 
Lankan society and culture (Berkwitz 2008). Evangelical Christian groups are primarily associated with 
Pentecostalism. They are qualitatively distinct from the ‘mainline’ denominations (e.g., Anglican, 
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Catholic, Christian Reformed, Methodist and Presbyterian) that were introduced during the colonial epoch 
and, unlike evangelical groups, are officially recognised by the Sri Lankan government. In light of this, I 
argue that restricting religious mobility has a more wide-ranging effect upon socio-cultural mobility, and 
can contribute to violent outcomes. Given the sensitive nature of the research, all respondent identifiers 
have been omitted (except for meta-level organisational and locational indicators) in the presentation of 
data that follows. 
 
Buddhist (in)security and ‘unethical’ conversion in Sri Lanka 
Buddhism is the dominant religion in Sri Lanka, and is fused to the majority Sinhala ethnicity. Since the 
1980s, when the left-leaning Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna political reform party called on monks to ‘lead’, 
‘rally’ and ‘fight against the government’ (Abeysekara 2002, 222), Buddhists have wielded considerable 
influence in the political domain. This re-imagination of the monk draws on contemporary interpretations 
of ancient Buddhist texts (in particular, the Mahavamsa – see Kemper 1991) to help redraw the discursive 
boundaries of Buddhism and to restore its prominence in the public domain. Since then, religious leaders 
– monks in particular – have used the ‘distinction of their religious position’ to reinforce the idea that 
their voices are ‘legitimate or pure’ (see also Fernando 2014; Johnson 2016, 311), and increasingly 
resonant in national politics. Political Buddhism has since materialised in two organisations: the Bodu 
Bala Sena (BBS – a nationalist monk organisation that has recently been embroiled in anti-Muslim 
campaigning – see Holt 2016), and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU – a monk-led political party). The 
political successes of the JHU in particular brought the discourse of Christian proselytisation to the public 
domain (Deegalle 2004; Fernando 2014; Gravers 2015; Schonthal 2016), providing a discursive anchor 
and exemplar of the negative influence of Christianity in Sri Lanka. Whilst the discourse of Christian 
proselytisation speaks primarily to evangelical Christian groups, it has, over the years, implicated 
mainline Christian denominations as well. Such implication is mostly a result of categorical conflation on 
behalf of Buddhists, although it should be noted that some mainline churches have also been accused of 
aggressive proselytisation. 
Below I explore how the construction of Christianity in a negative light serves to validate Buddhist 
hegemony in Sri Lanka, and how the self-Orientalising discourse of unethical conversion enables such 
hegemony to be (re)produced. I then examine two effects of Buddhist hegemony: the perpetuation of 
religious (im)mobility, and the vindication of violence. 
 
Christian globalism and the destabilisation of primordial power structures 
Conversion to Christianity weakens Buddhism, and is a symbolic reminder of Buddhist subjugation 
during the colonial era. Such weakening through conversion is less about the number of converts, and 
more about the symbolic ramifications of an individual choosing not to identify with the religion upon 
which the traditions of Sinhalese society and culture (and, more recently, politics as well) draws strength. 
Even the empowerment of Buddhism throughout the postcolonial era has not diminished its defensive 
fear of contemporary Christian evangelism. The discursive positioning of evangelical groups as being a 
threat to the Buddhist nation serves an important role in ‘rationalizing and covering deeper rooted fears’ 
(Korf 2006, 279) surrounding the role (and validity) of Buddhism in a modernising Sri Lanka, and a 
globalising world. Thus, fear is employed as a ‘potent political resource that is at once an expression of 
vulnerability to geopolitical threats and a rationale for security measures against them’ (Hyndman 2007, 
 8 
 
 
361). Constructions of the Christian threat take both local and global forms, and can contribute to a 
broader understanding of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka. 
 
At the local level, the praxis of Christian evangelism is recast as signs of aggression. Evangelism is an 
expression of religious agency that creates opportunities for new religious alternatives and, ultimately, 
conversion (see Asad 1996). Such alternatives have the potential to deflect power away from the religious 
nation, meaning: ‘when you speak about the Good News [i.e., evangelise], people [i.e., Buddhist groups] 
who … keep a certain segment of the people under their authority and rule, they lose their grip’ 
(Evangelical Parachurch, Galle). In order to minimise the effects of such a rebalancing of power, 
Buddhist groups have created a discourse that exaggerates the motivations and actions of evangelical 
groups. One Kandy-based Buddhist argued that ‘these evangelists have come into this country and created 
havoc; they’re very rabid’, whilst a Colombo-based counterpart described evangelical Christian groups as 
‘very vicious’.1 Such views were also expressed by representatives of mainline Christian groups towards 
their evangelical counterparts. To this point, the conflation of mainline and evangelical Christian groups 
by some Buddhists can (and has) caused some mainline churches to further distance themselves from – 
and condemn the actions of – evangelical groups. Destabilising and competitive to the point of 
aggression, such articulations of Christian threat at the local level are exacerbated when Christianity is 
reframed in a global schema. 
Evangelical praxis helps legitimise and sharpen constructions of the Buddhist nation. Often interpreted 
through an Occidentalist lens, Christianity is discursively positioned as foreign, colonising and aggressive 
in its growth. Christian groups are perceived to be ‘the hidden army of the [Western] cultural invasion’ 
(Buddhist Organisation, Colombo), and are often framed in a way that reveals the insecurity of Buddhist 
nationalism within a global schema: ‘the end of the [civil] war hasn’t changed a certain paranoia about 
Western imperialism and grand Protestant evangelical Christian schemes to destroy Sri Lanka and 
Buddhism’ (Evangelical Church, Galle); ‘the only way to get this country today is by religion’ (Buddhist 
Organisation, Kandy). Evangelical Christianity is, in sum, depicted as a religion at the ‘frontiers of 
[Western] hegemony’ (Nederveen Pieterse 1992, 13), and is portrayed as a symptom of more broad-based 
fears surrounding the ‘recolonisation’ of Sri Lanka by an omnipresent, globalising West (Goonatilake 
2006; see also Gunasekara 2012). Global forces have long been recognised as eroding the foundations of 
national identity, and symptoms of globalisation (e.g., Christianity) are often constructed in oppositional 
terms. A Buddhist convert to Christianity explained the relationship between Buddhism and Christianity 
with perceptiveness: 
They [Buddhist groups] hate Christians because of the global village, globalisation. The 
Buddhism is nationalism, but the Christian is supporting globalisation … Nationalism looks at 
this global village concept as a threat … Not just because of the religious thing, but because of the 
religious principle – the concept of God; no, no, this is against the nationalism … to the Buddhist, 
the Christian is the enemy. 
Establishing the scalar tension between Christianity as global and Buddhism as national is reductive, but 
necessary to enforce the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Defining the Christian other in oppositional 
                                                          
1 Such views were also expressed by representatives of mainline Christian groups towards their evangelical 
counterparts. To this point, the conflation of mainline and evangelical Christian groups by some Buddhists can (and 
has) caused some mainline churches to further distance themselves from – and condemn the actions of – evangelical 
groups. 
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terms is in the best interests of Buddhist nationalists as they seek to ‘intensify [their] own sense of 
[themselves] by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is closer to it and what is far away’ 
(Said 1978, 55). Discourses of Christian threat thus serve to distantiate Christianity from Buddhism, 
creating a gulf that unmasks ‘those structural relations through which security discourses are framed’ 
(Kinnvall 2004, 745). Examination of the ‘security discourses’ pertaining to Christian threat and Buddhist 
protection in Sri Lanka reveal their self-Orientalising nature, which ‘enforce[s] a particular reading of a 
threat according to which people and groups are defined’ (Kinnvall 2004, 745). As a result, Christian 
groups have been subjected to increasingly restrictive forms of structural opposition. By focusing on one 
example of self-Orientalism in Sri Lanka – the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill (or PFCB) – I 
argue that Buddhist protectionism is based upon a construction of Buddhism that is (de)mobilising. 
 
Self-Orientalism in praxis: the PFCB 
In 2004, the JHU drafted the PFCB – a legislative solution to the problem of unethical conversion in Sri 
Lanka. Although not (yet) passed,2 the PFCB proposes a range of measures to stem the problem: the 
registration of all conversions with the Divisional Secretary, and fines and imprisonment for those 
convicted of converting others by forceful, fraudulent or alluring means.3 In 2005, then-Minister of 
Buddha Sasana, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, clearly articulated the view of many Buddhist groups by 
stating that Sri Lankans must ‘accept the reality that Buddhism faces threats from certain other religious 
groups’ (Daily News 2005; Bauman and Ponniah 2017). The PFCB can therefore be seen as ‘a form of 
paranoia that feeds on cartographies of fear by producing “our” world negatively through the construction 
of a perverse “Other”’ (Springer 2011, 90), which, in turn, creates a ‘crisis in search of a response’ 
(Hyndman 2007, 368). Fear legitimises the PFCB, and the anti-Christian sentiment therein. Moreover, the 
discourse of unethical conversion reveals a broad-based strategy of self-Orientalism, which finds strength 
and legitimacy in Buddhist vulnerability. Whilst allegations of Christian aggression have monopolised 
public discourse to date (see Berkwitz 2008; Kong and Woods 2016), such vulnerability remains implied. 
Vulnerability is needed to legitimise the PFCB, but is an effect of self-Orientalism as well. A discourse is 
created wherein evangelical praxis in general – and conversion in particular – is seen to ‘discourage and 
distract vulnerable and not yet “awakened” individuals’ from developing the spiritual aptitudes that can 
enable them to discern the true worth of a religion’ (Mahadev 2014, 212). In explaining the need for the 
PFCB, a Kandy-based Buddhist monk told me how ‘our countries’ people are very innocent … Hindu and 
Buddhist [are] easy to convert’, whilst one representative of a Colombo-based Buddhist organisation 
outlined in more detail the self-Orientalising frame within which unethical conversion discourse is 
situated: 
All the people [i.e., Buddhists] are not intelligent about religion. There are poorish people, there 
are uneducated people, grassroots level, village level, community-based old women, young 
women; they don’t know anything about philosophy. So, somebody can go and convert him [sic]. 
Debasing those that ‘don’t know anything about philosophy’ foregrounds the need for their protection, 
and reflects the ‘conquering’ – or even colonising – effects of nationalism on local folk cultures (after 
                                                          
2 To date, the PFCB has not yet been passed. The example does, however, remain instructive. 
3 Conversion by force involves the threat of physical, social or divine harm if an individual refuse to convert; 
conversion by fraud involves the misrepresentation of religion or the conversion process; conversion by allurement 
involves the offering of any gift or other form of gratification in exchange for converting. 
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Gellner 1983). Buddhist nationalism is formed in response to the promises of evangelical Christianity, 
which are replete with images of upward social and economic mobility, physical and mental healing, 
international group solidarity and individual betterment that speak directly to the ‘poorish people’, 
‘uneducated people’, ‘grassroots level [people]’ that require protection. Buddhist groups struggle compete 
with their Christian counterparts on the same terms, and rely instead on a vision of agrarian modernity 
that is anchored by ‘villages sustained by agriculture, and purged of colonial influences’ (Fernando 2014, 
574). The failings of this vision exist in contradistinction to the models of Western modernity reflected in 
Christian praxis, and involve forms of social outreach such as education (specifically, English instruction) 
and the dispensing of (Western) medicine. Conversion to Christianity is therefore part of a broader 
discourse that is not just about rejecting a majority-group affiliation in favour of a maligned minority, but 
also a rejection of the vision of agrarian modernity upon which Buddhist hegemony draws strength. Put 
differently, the symbolic rejection of Buddhism in favour of Christianity serves to undermine the 
promises and highlight the failings of the Buddhist ruling elite. It shows how conversion is not just about 
a shift in religious belief and identification, but a shift in more wide-ranging socio-political loyalties as 
well (after Woods 2012b). Through the self-Orientalising discourse of unethical conversion, Buddhists 
are implicated in structure of marginality that enforces the prevailing asymmetry between self and other, 
Buddhist and Christian, tradition and modernity. 
The PFCB is a manifestation of Buddhist hegemony that draws upon a construction of Buddhists as an 
‘innocent crowd’ (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) that is, ironically, liable to exploitation. The 
innocence of the peasantry informs the rhetoric of (and for) manipulation, which has long been an 
‘illusion voluntarily cultivated by politicians and state institutions that limits other identity options’ 
(Wickramasinghe 2006, 334) in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the unethical label justifies the need for a 
legislative solution to the more pervasive, yet less polemical problem of conversion out of Buddhism: ‘the 
real hostility is to conversion, and “unethical” is just a small strand … if you actually talk to anyone 
making the “unethical” allegation, then you really realise that they are opposed to conversion per se’ 
(Evangelical Church, Galle). Indeed, over time the unethical label has become self-fulfilling, and serves 
to conflate ‘ethical’ with ‘unethical’ forms of conversion. As a result, nearly all conversion to Christianity 
is associated with the discourse of unethical action, as recognised by a Colombo-based representative of a 
parachurch organisation: 
Conversion has gotten so deep into people … the moment you say ‘I have become a Christian’, 
no-one, absolutely no-one is going to believe that you did it solely out of your personal 
experience, your personal feeling. They’re all going to think ‘no, somebody forced him, 
somebody put some wrong ideas into his head, somebody gave him some money, or somebody 
gave him this, somebody did that’. 
As this excerpt suggests, the unethical conversion discourse is virulent, and extends beyond the legal 
parameters defined by the PFCB. Such virulence is most pronounced in rural spaces, as self-Orientalism 
yields greatest effect where ‘the ability to change, and to view objectively what a person is saying could 
be very challenging’ (Evangelical Church, Colombo). It was also fomented (and, to an extent, validated) 
in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, during which evangelical organisations from 
around the world arrived in Sri Lanka to distribute aid and, in some instances, to proselytise as well (see 
Matthews 2007). Moreover, virulence also serves the purposes of the PFCB, as a balance between 
vulnerability and exploitation needs to be maintained if Buddhist groups are to maintain the integrity of 
their protective role. In other words, the projection of unethical intent onto all conversions to Christianity 
further restricts the potential for conversion, whilst perpetuating the hegemony of Buddhist groups. 
Through self-Orientalising discourses that restrict the potential for conversion, Buddhists are forced to 
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surrender their freedom of choice and the exercise of volition to the guardians of the religious nation to 
which they belong. Accordingly, cultural intransigence and religious (im)mobility are both outcomes of 
Buddhist protectionism in Sri Lanka. 
 
Socio-cultural intransigence and religious (im)mobility 
The self-Orientalising nature of Buddhist protectionism limits the potential for individual religious 
mobility. Religious mobility is the ability to convert out of an existing religion and into a new one, and is 
predicated on the volitional agency of the individual. Religious immobility, on the other hand, is when 
volitional agency is suppressed or restricted. Sri Lanka’s Buddhist groups fear religious mobility, as 
conversion out of Buddhism weakens their power, and undermines the coherence of the national identity 
from which they gain strength. It also evokes the colonial epoch, whereby conversion to Christianity 
provided a route to upward socio-economic mobility; a route that a Colombo-based representative of a 
Buddhist organisation claimed to still carry weight in the present day: ‘because of that colonial mentality, 
a lot of people are proud to say my son is studying at a church Montessori’. Indeed, one of Sri Lanka’s 
foremost Buddhist reformists during the colonial period, Anagarika Dharmapala (1907, 286), describes 
the ideal from which contemporary Buddhist groups take inspiration, with Sri Lanka being ‘free from 
foreign influences, untainted by alien customs, with the word of Buddha as their guiding light, the 
Sinhalese people lived a joyously cheerful life’. A Kandy-based representative of a Buddhist organisation 
clearly echoed such sentiment, reifying the view that ‘ideas about the past thus shape ideas about the 
present, and Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalists set the tone’ (Bartholomeusz and de Silva 1998, 6). In 
doing so, he highlights the restrictiveness of the self-Orientalising discourse, and the vantage point from 
which those who represent them view the Buddhist masses: 
75–85% of the people in this country are farmers, and they’re not wealthy farmers like you find in 
Europe, they live at the peasant level. But they lead a good quality of life … they eat well, they 
dress well, they have clean homes and their lives are mostly farming. Now once [they] get 
converted, I don’t think they like paddy farming because the culture is such that paddy farming 
doesn’t go with the status, of that status [that comes with being a Christian], because you are 
supposed to be better educated. You are in better clothes, you are speaking broken English, you 
meet different types of people. Now when you go on Sunday to their prayer centres, you find the 
English, white-skinned, Europeans are coming, because these people, they pat on the shoulders 
and say ‘hello my son’, and they love a pat from a white-skinned man, that is the problem being 
under colonial rule, you see … And such a person who walks into that group finds that to get back 
into the mud and plough behind the buffaloes is something little. 
The virtues of rural village life – eating well, dressing well and having clean homes – are presented here 
as failing to measure up to the standards of dress, education, language and social relations that are a 
perceived corollary to Christian conversion. By presenting the Buddhist self in terms of a ‘cultural 
stereotype which [is then] used to subordinate, classify and dominate’ (King 1999a, 159), the architects of 
Buddhist hegemony discursively stifle the mobility of the masses, and portray such socio-cultural 
intransigence as a force for the good of Sri Lanka. Indeed, the cultural dislocation associated with 
conversion to Christianity was, at times, amplified by Christian groups, who would embrace a self-
imposed mantle of ‘foreignness’ (as reflected in their casual dress and language – see Woods 2012a) in 
order to provide a clear alternative to Buddhism. In this sense, the ‘alternative’ associations of 
Christianity relate not just to religion, but to society, culture and economy as well. In light of this, the 
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PFCB is a clear attempt to restrict and control the religious mobility of Buddhists, as revealed during an 
interview with the leader of a Buddhist organisation in Colombo: 
 
Buddhist organisation: We don’t want anybody to be a Christian or to go to any other religion; we 
prevent it …  
Interviewer: So, the role of [the PFCB] is to stop Buddhists from converting to 
Christianity? 
Buddhist organisation: Definitely yes, firmly. 
 
Such sentiment reveals the often-unspoken intentions behind the PFCB. A respondent from a different, 
albeit ideologically aligned organisation added a degree of justification by explaining the exalted role of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka: ‘it’s not a mere religion for us, it’s our heritage, it’s our history, so we have an 
emotional link with Buddhism’. Contrariwise, Obeyesekere (2006, 151; see also Gombrich and 
Obeyesekere 1988; Obeyesekere 1991; Tambiah 1992) strongly refutes the conflation, rather than 
differentiation, of Buddhist doctrinal tradition and Buddhist history. Whilst the former is believed to be 
unchanging and impartial, the latter is invented and thus liable to ongoing invention and corruption. He 
adds that the conflation of ‘Buddhist history’ and Sinhala identity is erroneous (what he terms an 
‘essentialized and primordialized axiomatic identity’) and a primary source of inter- and intra-group 
tension. Not only that, but such conflation also creates an inviolable tension between the religious rights 
of the nation, and the religious freedom of the individual. 
Whilst the PFCB is widely viewed as a legislative infringement upon the rights of the individual (Owens 
2007), such an infringement is often obfuscated by the demobilising effect of culture on religious choice. 
Culture is an important arbiter of religious immobility; it obfuscates the ethics of religious freedom, and 
forms the structural underpinnings of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka. A triumvirate of cultural 
belonging collapses elements of religion (Buddhism), ethnicity (Sinhalese) and language (Sinhala) into a 
single grouping that pre-determines behaviours, attitudes and choices – ‘there is this cultural 
bondage … there [i]s a kind of binding of the people, and he [the monk] is consulted for everything. That 
is quite strong in the village, and they see the Christians coming in and disrupting that unity’ (Evangelical 
Church, Colombo) – and which is enforced by the primacy of the monk in the village setting: ‘in Sri 
Lanka, the most power is in the Buddhist monk; the Buddhist monk say anything, the people will listen’ 
(Evangelical Church, Galle). This has precipitated a transformation of the universalist Buddhist tradition 
in Sri Lanka, as it has done with Hinduism in India, and Islam in Pakistan (see van der Veer 1994, 1996, 
2001). The cultural context restricts the possibilities for individual religious mobility, as religion is tied to 
ethnicity, and ethnicity is a relatively more fixed category of identification and belonging than religion. 
This dynamic was clearly explained by the leader of an evangelical Church in Galle: 
You are within a certain frame where the religion and the race are very, very close … People feel 
that if you are a Sinhalese, you have got to be a Buddhist. It goes with the culture, the customs of 
the land … So, anyone leaving the temple and coming to the church [i.e., converting] is an insult 
to the Sinhala people, the Sinhala race … This creates a great barrier [to conversion]. 
Ethnicity is a relatively immutable anchor of identity that, in Sri Lanka, is inextricably associated with 
religion, thus restricting the possibilities for religious experimentation and change. Conversion to 
Christianity can therefore be seen as emancipatory insofar as it provides an opportunity to decouple 
ethno-religious identity, and thus liberate individuals from the ethno-religious frame into which they are 
born. In abstract form, Christianity thus represents the ‘constant change and innovation of the modern 
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world’, which is in contrast to Buddhist ‘attempt[s] to structure at least some parts of social life within it 
as unchanging and invariant’ (Hobsbawm 1983, 2). This is problematic for those (Buddhist groups) who 
rely on the conjoining of religion and ethnicity, as conversion means ‘not only they change the religion, 
they change the entire mindset’ (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). Religion (which Christians see as 
universal) and cultural belonging (which is place-specific) are divorced from each other, rather than 
mutually constitutive: ‘religion, or belief, supersedes culture; culture can be wrong, bible can never be 
wrong … If you look at the bible, God liberates you [from culture]’ (Evangelical Church, Kandy). The 
need to ‘liberate’ Sri Lankans (specifically the Sinhalese) from the cultural frame within which they are 
bound is a guiding principle of Christian evangelisation, as doing so will remove (or, at least, reduce) a 
significant barrier to religious mobility. The ensuing structure of marginality enforced by Buddhist groups 
promotes national fortitude at the expense of individual advancement. Such promotion is, as Tambiah 
(1986, 92) argues, symptomatic of the fact that hegemonic impulses have rendered the Sinhala-Buddhist 
identity as ‘militant, populist, fetishized’, and as bastardising the traditions upon which it is based. Taken 
to the extreme, the invariable outcome of an identity that is based on ‘marginalization, exclusion, and 
related vulnerability’ (Hyndman 2007, 363) is the sanctioning of various forms of violence against those 
that are alien or other. 
 
The violent effects of self-Orientalism 
The self-Orientalising discourse of ‘unethical’ conversion builds on, but also feeds into, the competitive 
desire of both Buddhist and Christian groups to ‘overcome, eliminate, or convert the other to extinction’ 
(Bouma 2007, 190), and can cause violence to perpetuate. Indeed, whilst 2009 marked the end of the 
decades-long civil war in Sri Lanka, Buddhist hegemony continues to orchestrate violent outcomes 
against the Christian other, and the Buddhist self as well. The ontological incongruence between 
Buddhism and violence has only recently been labelled a ‘misconception’ (Jerryson 2010, 3), and presents 
a relationship that is worthy of greater theorisation (see Jerryson and Juergensmeyer 2010; in particular 
Kent 2010). The pervasiveness of what Jazeel and Ruwanpura (2009, 385) term a ‘war culture’ in Sri 
Lanka foregrounds ‘the drive to colonize and militarize the cultural and political field’ which, in turn, 
contributes to a number of (hitherto underexplored) violent outcomes (see Fox 2004; Gravers 2015; 
Johnson 2016). To this end, the following discussion explores the modalities of violence that are 
outcomes of Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka: the symbolic violence of self-Orientalism, and the physical 
violence perpetrated that is an outcome of self-Orientalising discourse. 
In the first instance, self-Orientalism is a form of symbolic violence that restricts the mobility, 
advancement and autonomy of Buddhists. Evangelical groups have been known to provide possibilities of 
modernity and opportunities for various forms of socio-cultural mobility; a dynamic that adds ballast to 
Haynes’ (1994; Fox 2000; Spohn 2003) argument that ‘the arrival and consolidation of contemporary 
religious militancy is rooted in the failed promise of modernity’. The promises of Christianity offer a 
stark and immediate reminder of such failures and, as a result, are reframed by Buddhist groups in terms 
of unethical conversion and religious imperialism. Self-Orientalism perpetuates a situation whereby the 
benefits of modernisation become increasingly clustered and shared amongst a Colombo-based elite and 
their thinly spread networks of rural politicians, whilst poverty is reproduced (especially in rural areas), 
and socio-economic aspirations restricted (especially amongst women and youth) (Hettige and Mayer 
2000; see also Korf 2006). Moreover, constructing a monolithic, out of touch populace that is 
disconnected and alienated from the processes of modernisation can also encourage violent recourse to 
external threat. 
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In the second instance, protection stems from the same cultural rhetoric that enforces the religious 
immobility outlined above. Buddhism as religion is subordinated to Buddhism as heritage; the former is 
for individual merit, whereas the latter is a form of collective solidarity that is worth fighting to protect. 
Violence is the invariable outcome of the protection of Buddhist heritage – ‘I am a Buddhist, I know 
something of Buddhism, I know it is my heritage … [Therefore] we have to fight, we have to preserve, we 
have to safeguard’ (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) – creating a situation whereby ‘all kinds of 
misbehaviour is looked at as [Buddhist] heroism’ (Evangelical Church, Colombo). Indeed, the power of 
self-Orientalising discourse is that it ‘legitimize[s] a state of exception where force stands out-of-the-law 
but needs to be justified as being within the law’ (Korf 2006, 279; see also Johnson 2016). Violence is 
often an outcome of the need to protect the sanctity of the Buddhist village from Christian encroachment, 
as explained by one Colombo-based representative of a Buddhist organisation: 
The village that was living in absolute harmony, then suddenly they thought, how can this happen 
to our village [i.e., Christian expansion]? Then they [the villagers] team up and they say ‘stop’. 
When it is not stopped … then you have to eject by force. Sometimes it [a church] has been 
burned down. (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo) 
Here, Christian presence is seen to disrupt the ‘absolute harmony’ of the village, with such disruption 
catalysing the need to ‘eject by force’. Violence is often employed as a strategy of intimidation that is 
designed to repel Christian groups and buildings from becoming established in a locality. Importantly, 
Christian presence (i.e., people and buildings) is often divorced from the actions for which evangelical 
Christian groups are condemned (i.e., unethical conversion), and which form the actual threat. Put 
differently, violence is targeted at Christian presence rather than specific actions, suggesting that the 
discourse provides more of a pretext for anti-Christian sentiment than it does a solution to the problem of 
aggressive strategies of proselytisation (i.e., those that use force, fraud or allurement to facilitate 
conversion). Conversion is a far more wide-ranging problem – one that requires critical self-reflection on 
behalf of the Buddhist monastic community – whereas unethical conversion holds the ability to incite 
anger, and is therefore readily evoked. One pastor based in the south of the country recounted an 
experience that highlights the wide-ranging animosity towards Christian presence: 
Evangelical pastor: In 2002, they attacked my church; they beat me up. A monk came and excited 
the people and they came to the house [where church services were held] and 
smashed it up …  
Interviewer: Why did they attack you? 
Evangelical pastor: They [the monks] said this is a Buddhist village, and people cannot convert to 
Christianity. 
 
As this example suggests, Buddhist security is predicated upon homogeneity, with religious conversion 
(and more broadly speaking, Christian presence), serving to weaken the structure of the ‘Buddhist 
village’. As a result, Christian groups of all incarnations are implicated by the discourse of Christian 
threat, even those that are historically entrenched, and broadly accepted in society. Whilst the perpetration 
of violence is an outcome of self-Orientalising discourse in Sri Lanka, its denominational blindness serves 
to not only enhance the power of nationalist groups (causing the discourse to perpetuate), but to further 
denigrate Buddhists as well: ‘our poor common masses don’t identify that [the differences between 
Christian groups]; they have no knowledge, they have no skill to differentiate the traditional Christian and 
the Catholic Church from these extremist [i.e., evangelical] elements’ (Buddhist Organisation, Colombo). 
The self-Orientalising frame of Buddhist nationalism serves to manipulate the understanding of the ‘poor 
common masses’ by creating and entrenching inter-group differences (i.e., between Christian and 
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Buddhist), whilst obfuscating intra-group differences (i.e., within Christianity or within Buddhism). 
Importantly, whilst the obfuscation of Christian intra-group differences results in the often-indiscriminate 
persecution of all Christian groups, the obfuscation of Buddhist intra-group differences ‘leaves the 
fundamental type a lot of space to act’ (Evangelical Church, Colombo). In turn, this results in the growing 
penetration of violence as a method of Christian containment. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have explored how self-Orientalism is a concept that draws attention to how groups 
appropriate and (re)produce hegemonic discourse to serve their own, often self-fulfilling, purposes. At a 
global level, the constructed has become the constructor, reflecting an important shift in the locus, and 
effect, of power. Self-Orientalism paints and glorifies a picture of the national self that is immobile and 
restrict(ed/ive), and serves to ‘not only to distort the complexity of the subject matter but also remain in 
complicity with particular ideological agendas’ (King 1999b, 94; see also Friedland 2001). Far from being 
a process of self-realisation, however, self-Orientalism is instead a repackaging of hegemony in a way 
that serves the few at the expense of the many. To this end, the assumptions embedded within – and 
public criticism of – the actions, policies and ideologies of nationalist groups require closer interrogation. 
Doing so will help identify and address some of the restrictions (ideological or otherwise) that may 
currently be stifling the emancipation of individuals and communities implicated by the various forms of 
nationalism at play throughout the (postcolonial) world. 
In addition, whilst “Orientalist discourse” has legitimated the colonial aggression and political supremacy 
of the Western world’ (King 1999a, 148), self-Orientalism legitimises aggression against contemporary 
symbols of the colonial past, such as Christianity. Such aggression is of particular concern in Sri Lanka, 
where the transition to ‘a more equitable “post-war Sri Lanka” depends not just on territorial 
securitisation of the island’s geography, but also on forging dissident and dynamic space for debate and 
dialog around the composition of the contemporary Sri Lankan national’ (Jazeel and Ruwanpura 2009, 
385). Currently, the persistence of Buddhist hegemony stunts the ‘forging’ of ‘dissident and dynamic 
space for debate and dialog’ in favour of a more uncompromising ‘composition of the contemporary Sri 
Lankan national’ instead. Such uncompromising compositions simultaneously strengthen the grip of 
Buddhist hegemony, whilst undermining the possibilities for religious pluralism and freedom, and for 
national reconciliation. How the Sri Lankan case compares and contrasts with other religiously defined 
nations – Buddhist or otherwise – presents an avenue of research that can help sharpen the initial 
understandings of self-Orientalism and religious (im)mobility outlined in this paper. 
Finally, recent events4 have foregrounded the need to interrogate the production of academic knowledge 
that implicates the postcolonial world. This accords with King’s (1999b, 187) warning of the need to 
remain sceptical of the presupposition that ‘scholars who have taken the post-Saidian “postcolonial turn” 
can now claim to be free from complicity with regimes of domination’, and Gombrich’s (2006) reminder 
that academic knowledge producers are implicated within and by the same regimes of hegemony, power 
and control as the postcolonial contexts that we write about. Whilst my reading and conceptualisation of 
the self-Orientalising discourse of ‘unethical’ conversion in Sri Lanka is implicated within the same 
framework of power as the architects of the discourse, this paper is an attempt to ‘widen the field of 
                                                          
4 See http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/pb-assets/TWQ-response-Sept-2017.pdf for an overview of 
the recent publication (and subsequent retraction) of a viewpoint essay entitled ‘The Case for Colonialism’ in Third 
World Quarterly. 
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discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing authority’ (Said 1978, xxiii). It is not an attempt 
to condone, support or defend the actions of either contemporary evangelical Christian groups in Sri 
Lanka, nor their colonial forebears. I am not a Christian, nor am I a Buddhist. If my ideas appear to be 
overly critical of Buddhist groups and apologetic towards their evangelical Christian counterparts, then 
this is more a reflection of the fact that my sample (and, therefore, data) was skewed towards the 
representatives of Christian organisations. Whilst I appreciate that this paper contributes to the politics of 
academic knowledge production, I hope that these disclosures will enable readers to interpret and 
understand my argument in a relatively more transparent light. 
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